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1Abstract
The past forty years or so has seen a remarkable transformation
in macro-models used by central banks, policymakers and forecasting
bodies. This papers describes this transformation from reduced-form
behavioural equations estimated separately, through to contemporary
micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els estimated by systems methods. In particular by treating DSGE
models estimated by Bayesian-Maximum-Likelihood methods I argue
that they can be considered as probability models in the sense de-
scribed by Sims (2007) and be used for risk-assessment and policy
design. This is true for any one model, but with a range of models
on oer it is possible also to design interest rate rules that are simple
and robust across the rival models and across the distribution of pa-
rameter estimates for each of these rivals as in Levine et al. (2008).
After making models better in a number of important dimensions, a
possible road ahead is to consider rival models as being distinguished
by the model of expectations. This would avoid becoming `a prisoner
of a single system' at least with respect to expectations formation
where, as I argue, there is relatively less consensus on the appropriate
modelling strategy.
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Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary pol-
icy landscape; it is the dening characteristic of that landscape.
Alan Greenspan1
Central Banks face a number of sources of uncertainty providing the \dening
characteristics" for formulating monetary policy. As part of the operational
procedures for determining monetary policy central banks throughout the
world construct forecasts based on past data and judgement, but immedi-
ately come up against the rst source of uncertainty { from limitations of
data. Any measurement involves measurement errors; for macroeconomic
data the dierences between `real-time' and revised data are an indication
of the magnitude of these errors. But limitations of data goes deeper than
measurement errors involving GDP, ination and so on. In all economies,
but especially emerging economies, a section of the economy is not directly
observed at all. This is the problem of the `hidden' economy in developed
economies referred to as the `informal economy' in emerging economies.2
The second source of uncertainty arises from disagreements over theo-
retical models. Inevitably economists dier in their theoretical frameworks.
However I would suggest their has been a remarkable convergence in the
profession towards a common methodology based on rm micro-foundations
and systems estimation. This is reviewed in the next section. But even if we
can agree on a modelling framework and we believe the data is suciently
reliable for the estimation of our model there is a third source of uncertainty
with which to contend { that from changes in behavioural relationships. If
1Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas (2003), Opening Remarks.
2Schneider (2005), using a combination of the DYMIMIC and demand-currency ap-
proach, reports results on the size of the informal economy for 110 countries. The estimates
show that the informal sector has increased considerably in African countries, but also in
other developing economies. Upward trends are also found for transitional and developed
economies. The increase in informality is conrmed in Perry et al. (2007) for a subset of
countries. The general trend of informality for Latin American and the Caribbean suggests
an increase over time even if dierences exist between informal salaried and self-employed.
A recent survey of this literature is provided in Batini et al. (2009b).
1the model is micro-founded these changes must originate from the parameters
and functional forms dening consumer tastes and technology. A tractable
way of dealing with these is to assume exogenous stochastic shocks shift pref-
erences and change productivity. A robust monetary policy will then set out
to maximize some expected welfare criterion averaged over the distributions
of these shocks.
But there is far more to robust policy then dealing with exogenous un-
certainty. Policymakers must also incorporate robustness with respect to
model uncertainty that takes into account the possibility that their mod-
elling framework is wrong and within each framework they must allow for
the fact that they estimate parameter distributions and not just their mode.
With parameter distribution we have in eect a distribution of models. In
the words of Sims (2007) models now become probability models. Armed
with a series of probability models across dierent modelling frameworks the
policymaker can now incorporate risk assessment and robust rules into the
conduct of policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of
the evolution of macroeconomic modelling strategies over the past thirty or
so years. Section 3 discusses dierent approaches to robustness before going
onto our favoured Bayesian approach to section 4. Section 5 concludes with
suggestions for future research.
2 Towards a Common Modelling Methodol-
ogy
The past forty years or so has seen a remarkable transformation in macro-
models used by central banks, policymakers and forecasting bodies. In the
1960s-70s econometric models were based on equation-by-equation estima-
tion of reduced form behavioural equations without explicit expectations.
Large models were then constructed using these behavioural relationships
as building blocks alongside identities dening aggregate demand, trade bal-
2ances and the government budget constraint. The introduction of rst adap-
tive and then rational expectations led to what proved to be a fatal blow for
this generation of models { the Lucas Critique (Lucas (1972)). In the con-
text of forward-looking agents with rational expectation this critique showed
that apparently stable empirical backward-looking relationship between, for
example, consumption, post-tax income and real consumption was not inde-
pendent of the policy rule in place. The implication of this nding is that
these models were at best suitable for forecasting on the basis of a contin-
uation of existing policy and were unt for the purpose of examining the
consequences of dierent policies. Looking back from the vantage point of
today, these apparently structural models were no better that VARs for fore-
casting and ranking policies.
Early models certainly lacked coherence in that dierent behavioural re-
lationships involving the same optimizing agent such as the rm often led
an independent existence. The seminal paper Kydland and Prescott (1982)
produced the rst small coherent dynamic general equilibrium macro model
built from solid micro-foundations with expected utility optimizing forward-
looking agents. This rst `Real Business Cycle' (RBC) model was stochas-
tic and therefore of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) form,
with only one exogenous shock to technology. Despite this simple structure,
the model was remarkably successful at reproducing the volatilities of some
observed variables.
Although there were many dimensions along which the RBC model failed
on its own terms (notably in reproducing observed output persistence and
the volatility of hours), the move to the latest incarnation of New Keyne-
sian (NK) DSGE models was driven, at least within academia, by the need
to replicate the monetary transmission mechanism from monetary shocks to
short-run uctuations revealed by numerous VAR studies. Central banks of
course seized upon this development of an intellectually sound model that
the same time gave them a raison d'etre. The main features of the NK DSGE
models are rst a real RBC core with an outer shell consisting of nominal
3rigidities and other frictions. These are increasingly estimated by systems
estimation using Bayesian-Maximum Likelihood Estimation. DYNARE de-
veloped by Michel Juillard and his collaborators has proved a very popular
software package for carrying out the estimation procedure.
NK DSGE models are widely used especially by central banks and are
generally seen to constitute an \impressive achievement" Blanchard (2008).
But there are acknowledged shortcomings. The rst is fundamental and com-
mon to RBC and NK models alike { problems with rationality and Expected
Utility Maximization (EUM). The second is that DSGE models examine uc-
tuations about an exogenous balanced growth path and there is no role for
endogenous growth. The third consists of a number of empirical concerns
and nally there is another fundamental problem with any micro-founded
macro-model { that of heterogeneity and aggregation. We consider these in
turn.
The assumption of rationality in general and that of rational expectations
in particular has naturally generated a lively debate in economics and the so-
cial sciences. The assumption of perfect rationality has come under scrutiny
since the 1950s when Herbert A. Simon claimed that agents are not realisti-
cally so rational so as to aspire to pay-o maximization. Instead he proposed
'bounded rationality` as a more realistic alternative to the assumption of ra-
tionality, incorporating players' inductive reasoning processes. This is the
route that the Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) models take
(see, for example, LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008)). Certainly, experimental
studies of decision-making show human behaviour to be regularly inconsis-
tent and contradictory to the assumption of perfect rationality. That said,
experiments using people and ACE models suggest agents can learn to be
rational so that rationality may well be a reasonable empirical postulate to
describe behaviour near a long-run steady state. This view is supported by
statistical learning in theoretical macro-models which converges to rational
expectations equilibria (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001))
Models can only be beaten by alternative models. A model of irrationality
4has to pin down why one decision is preferred to another and here we observe
that analytically tractable theories of the inconsistency and irrationality in
human behaviour simply have not yet been developed. Hence our best ana-
lytical models are based on the rationality assumption as we unfortunately
have nothing superior on oer. However we can be more positive than that
at least when it comes to competitive behaviour. Darwinian selection helps
rational (that is, prot-maximizing) rms (prot-maximizing) to succeed in
competition.
Perhaps the most convincing argument for adopting the rationality argu-
ment is provided by Myerson (1999). If we rst appreciate that the aim of
social sciences is not only to predict human behaviour in the abstract but
also, crucially, to analyze social institutions and assess proposals for their
reform. As such, it is useful to evaluate these institutions under the assump-
tion of perfect rationality, which in turn intimates that the agents in the
institution are always seeking to maximize their payo. In this way, we can
solve for aws as either defects in the institutional structure (and thereby in-
stitutional reform is the required solution) or as aws in the rationality of the
agents (which begs for improved education and/or provision of information
for individuals). Accordingly this has become a logical and useful assumption
for economists in order to see with more clarity when social problems must
be solved by institutional reform. This argument can be rened to illustrate
why this individual perfection assumption should be one of intelligent ratio-
nal maximization, as in the models of non-cooperative game theory. Thus
an argument for reform of social institutions (rather than for re-education of
individuals) is most persuasive when it is based on a model which assumes
that individuals intelligently understand their environment and rationally act
to maximize their own welfare.3
Even if we accept utility maximization, there still is an issue of whether it
should be expected utility maximization (EUM). An alternative supported by
experiments is Prospect Theory which takes into account that people behave
3I am grateful to Mustapha Doukoure for this summary of the Myerson argument.
5as if extremely improbable events are impossible and extremely probable
events are certain (see Shiller (1999)). Prospect theory can explain phenom-
ena such as the equity premium puzzle. However it is extremely dicult in
incorporate into general equilibrium modelling; in the words of Shiller \EUM
can be a workhorse for some sensible research".
Turning to our second limitation { the lack of a role for endogenous
growth. As Lucas (1987) pointed out the welfare gains from eliminating
business cycle uctuations in the standard RBC model are very small and
are dwarfed by the gains from increased growth. It is true that adding New
Keynesian frictions signicantly increases the gains from stabilization pol-
icy, but they still remain small compared with those from increased growth.
Surprisingly there has been little work on introducing long-run growth into
DSGE models; Wang and Wen (2008) is a rare example of such an attempt.
This is clearly an important priority for future work.
Our third limitation centres on the empirical dimension. Although Bayesian
Maximum-Likelihood estimation is a giant step forward from the calibration
methods of earlier RBC models there are concerns associated with identica-
tion, ability to match VARS, too many shocks required, too little attention
to priors and the parametric assumptions surrounding technology and con-
sumer preferences. Identication issues are a very active area of research (see,
Canova and Sala (2006), Iskrev (2008), Ratto (2008), for example, research
that is feeding into toolboxes available in DYNARE. The critique by Chari
et al. (2008) focuses mainly on ill-conceived shocks in a standard NK model
that are not structural or consistent with micro-econometric evidence. Many
of the other issues are discussed in an excellent recent review, Fernandez-
Villaverde (2009).
Not all these empirical concerns can be addressed by better econometrics.
Although asset prices make an appearance in the standard DSGE model they
still do a terrible job at matching them with data. Our models cannot ac-
count for a range of nancial observations ranging from the equity premium
(Mehra and Prescott (1985)) to the slope of the yield (Campbell (2003)). As
6Smith (2008) points out these are rst-order conicts between data and the-
ory about levels and not the second-order considerations about covariances
considered up to now. One response is compromise theoretical rigor for sta-
tistical t by combining DSGE and VAR (or rather global VAR or GVAR)
structures as Pesaran and Smith (2006). Another response is to improve the
models by exploring dierent utility functions (or `exotic preferences') as in
Barro (2007).
Finally we turn to what is perhaps the most important issue in micro-
founded macroeconomics {that of of heterogeneous agents and aggregation.
The rst generation of DSGE models, the RBC models stayed within the
representative agent paradigm. The current wave of New Keynesian mod-
els have made only the slightest deviation from this framework by assuming
consumers have access to complete markets. Then if though they may dier
in their initial tastes, are subject to staggered wage contracts and are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks they still face a common budget constraint and the
economy in aggregate does not depend on the distribution of individual qual-
ities. By contrast a recent literature is developing macroeconomics from the
study of average consumption, output and inputs involving the interaction
of these representative households and rms, to the study of the entire dis-
tribution of these variables. A recent insightful survey of these developments
is provided by Heathcote et al. (2009).
Aggregation certainly matters! For example in a standard RBC model
but with indivisible labour, An et al. (2008) show that a representative agent
model can only explain the data if one assume an implausible household util-
ity function. However progress in embracing heterogeneity has been conned
to simple RBC models and still faces technical problems in solving for a
rational expectations equilibrium. ACE models (again see LeBaron and Tes-
fatsion (2008)) certainly tackle aggregation head-on and dispense with the
latter problem by ditching rational expectations. But should central banks
go down this path for their models? To quote LeBaron and Tesfatsion they
(ACE models) \raise some practical complications for the applied econo-
7metrician... computational methods such a method of moments might be
too computationally costly to undertake ... Researchers at central banks
might never decide to t giant ACE macro models to data." Aggregation
remains a dicult problem in macroeconomics. Economics cannot copy the
success of statistical physics in tackling this problem because unlike atoms
and molecules in physics, economic agents are conscious and calculating!
3 In Praise of Robustness
... the ECB has no intention of being the prisoner of a single
system ... We highly praise robustness. There is no substitute
for a comprehensive analysis of the risks to price stability. Jean-
Claude Trichet4
All these modelling alternatives highlight the need for robustness in pol-
icy design. Here the literature is sharply divided between two schools: the
rst has been developed by Hansen and Sargent (2003), Hansen and Sar-
gent (2007) (henceforth HS) and assumes unstructured uncertainty using
a minimax robustness criterion to design monetary rules. It has three key
ingredients that distinguishes it from alternatives. First, it conducts `local
analysis' in the sense that it assumes that the true model is known only up
to some local neighbourhood of models that surround the `approximating'
or `core' model. Second, it uses a minimax criterion without priors in model
space. Third, the type of uncertainty is both unstructured and additive being
reected in additive shock processes that are `chosen' by malevolent nature
to feed back on state variables and so has to maximize the loss function the
policy-maker is trying to minimize.
There are a number of question marks against the HS approach to robust-
ness. First it pursues optimal policy, not optimized simple rules. As Levine
and Pearlman (2010) show if one designs simple operational rules that mimic
4 Trichet (2005).
8the fully optimal but complex rule then they take the form of highly uncon-
ventional Taylor Rules which must respond to Nature's malign interventions.
They would be very hard to sell to policymakers.
HS robust control may be appropriate if little information is available
on the underlying uncertainty facing the policymaker. But is this really the
case with respect to the eect of particular monetary rules on the macro-
economy? Central banks devote considerable resources to this end in their
assessment of the forecasting properties of the approximating model, those
of rival models and estimates of parameter uncertainty gleaned from various
estimation methods. To then fail to fully utilize the fruits of this exercise
seems both incongruous and a counsel of despair. The Bayesian approach
by contrast fully utilizes the modelling eorts of the policymaker and further
exploits all the information available including priors. This we now turn to.
4 A Robust Bayesian Procedure and Some
Results
... the conduct of monetary policy ... has come to involve, at
its core, crucial elements of risk management. This conceptual
framework emphasizes understanding as much as possible the many
sources of risk and uncertainty that policy makers faces, quanti-
fying those risks when possible, and assessing the costs associated
with each of the risks. In essence, the risk management approach
to monetary policy making is an application of Bayesian decision-
making. Alan Greenspan5
Following Levine et al. (2008), we rst show how robust policy considera-
tions may be embedded within a very general Bayesian probabilistic decision
framework. Consider uncertainty of two forms: exogenous stochastic white
noise shocks (`states of nature') and model uncertainty (which decomposes
5 Greenspan (2004).
9into model structure and parameter uncertainty where parameters include
those capturing the persistence the covariances of the exogenous shocks).
Let ,  and  represent, respectively, the states of nature, the parameter
set and the actions that a policymaker may take. Whenever policy  2 
(e.g., an ination targeting rule) is implemented for state of nature  2 , a
given model mi, i 2 1;M, taken from M discrete candidates and a given set
of parameters i 2 i, a loss is incurred: Li :   i   ! R. Evaluating
this over all possible states of nature yields an expected loss





where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of , f(i;).
In particular, for a central value  i of i this expected loss is denoted by

i( i;).
For a given model mi, i 2 [1;M] and a set of observed data y 2 Y , there
may be a posterior distribution for i given by pi(ijy;mi), so that there is a







This provides a measure of robustness of the policy for a given model, given
the distribution of parameters for that model. Calculation of (1) is numer-
ically facilitated in discrete space by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods that allows the sampling of a given distribution (e.g. the model's
posterior density) by simulating an appropriately-constructed Markov chain.
Thus the integral in (2) is approximated by a sum.
Now assume in addition that there is model uncertainty, with posterior
odds given by prob(mi is the correct modeljy) =i; 1  i  M. The Bayesian
policymaker seeks  to be robust to this as well, so that the posterior risk in







which incorporates both inter-model uncertainty or Model Averaging (BMA)
of Brock et al (2003, 2007) and intra-model uncertainty. Note that the rival
models approach (which we do not utilize in this paper, since we have a
posterior distribution that we can use) arises as the special case i = 1
M, 8i,










Thus the generation of the MCMC draws permits us to capture uncer-
tainty in a structured manner: for a given model the policymaker knows not
only the central location of, say, wage indexation, but also its dispersion from
the MCMC draws of the posterior density. A Bayesian policymaker would
exploit this information, and will further acknowledge the many candidate
models that may characterize the economy (the BMA standpoint).
The policymaker would typically also choose an optimal (simple) rule opt
for each of the cases 
i( i;), 
i() and  
(), so that in the last case we





( i;) compare the welfare loss outcome under robust policy with
that when the true model turns out to be mi with parameter central values
 i. We take these as measures of the cost of robustness.
Equation (3) represents the statement of Bayesian uncertainty and is
formally standard, e.g., Leamer (1978), Koop (2003). The nature and se-
riousness of (3) lies in its implementation. We make some points on our
own implementation. First, and most bluntly, we take the Bayesian state-
ment seriously. By contrast, in much of the literature, uncertainty forms
- data, exogenous elements, model, parameter - are considered separately.
Second, the policymaker's welfare criterion is assumed to be a quadratic ap-
proximation of the representative agent's utility function (using the \large
11distortions" approximation); invariably past studies have used ad-hoc welfare
measures independent of the preferences of the agent's optimization environ-
ment. This, however, negates the agenda of building micro-founded models
in the rst place. The nal point relates to an environment of bilateral
decision makers in forward-looking settings. Although the policymaker may
insure against structured uncertainty, there is no guarantee the private sector
gaze into the same deluxe crystal ball. If they do, then the robust Bayesian
rule denes the common environment. If not, then the CB and private sec-
tor may have dierent perceptions of the state of the world and the former
must contemplate robust rules integrated over mis-perceptions of model type
fm = mi;me = mjgM
j6=i where me = mj denotes that the private sector be-
lieves in model j. That denes the model-inconsistent robust Bayesian rule.
The model posterior probabilities referred to in this analysis are con-
structed as follows. Let pi (jmi) represent the prior distribution of the
parameter vector  2  for some model mi 2 M and let L(yj;mi) denote
the likelihood function for the observed data y 2 Y conditional on the model
and the parameter vector. The joint posterior distribution of  for model mi
combines the likelihood function with the prior distribution:
pi (jy;mi) / L(yj;mi)pi (jmi) (5)
Bayesian inference also allows a framework for comparing alternative and
potentially mis-specied models based on their marginal likelihood. For a
given model mi 2 M and common dataset, the latter is obtained by inte-





where pi (jmi) is the prior density for model mi, and L(yjmi) is the data
density for model mi given parameter vector . To compare models (say,
mi and mj) we calculate the posterior odds ratio which is the ratio of their
posterior model probabilities (or Bayes Factor when the prior odds ratio,
12p(mi)












Components (7) and (8) are important as they provide a framework for
comparing alternative and potentially mis-specied models based on their
marginal likelihood. Such comparisons are important in the assessment of
rival models.
Based on this framework Levine et al. (2008) propose a general method-
ology and application for designing robust simple monetary rules. The rst
step is the estimation of a number n of rival DSGE models. In this particular
study we considered variants of the seminal Smets and Wouters (2003) model
of the Euro area distinguished by the existence or otherwise of price and wage
indexing. This admittedly only considered robustness is over a narrow range
of modelling alternatives, but the methodology can be applied to a greater
diversity of model. Using Bayesian-Maximum Likelihood estimation resulted
in estimated model probabilities, p(mijy) in (7) and parameter joint distri-
butions pi (jy;mi) for each model in (5). These represent our `quantied
risks' stressed in the Greenspan quote.
The purpose of the exercise is to design robust interest rate ination tar-
geting rules that respond to expected future price and current wage ination
about the steady state. They are of the form
it = it 1 + Ett+j + wwt ;  2 [0;1] (9)
where it is the nominal interest rate set at the beginning of period t, t
is current price ination over the interval [t   1;t], Ett+j denotes expec-
tations at time t of ination over the interval [t + j   1;t + j] and wt is
the corresponding current wage ination rate. The lagged term represents a
smoothing eect and if  = 1 we have an integral rule in which the change
13in the interest rate responds to price and wage ination. All variables are
proportional deviations about their steady states. This form of interest rate
rule is then designed to incorporate increasing degrees of robustness:
 Model-variant and parameter robustness by maximizing expected wel-
fare with respect to parameters ,  and w across the rival models
and across estimated parameter distributions within each model
 First assume model-consistent expectations: private sector and central
bank believe in the same model and parameter combination
 Then allow for model-inconsistent expectations where the private sector
and central bank can have dierent perceptions of the true model and
parameter combination.
Thus under Bayesian decision-making, the central bank has no single
model of the economy to communicate to the private sector (or to which it
itself necessarily subscribes) and no ex-ante knowledge of the realized state
of the economy. Likewise, with an active private sector. Both consider
many scenarios in their decision-making and in the case of model-inconsistent
expectations they do so without coordination.
Three results stand out in this study. First there is general support for the
proposition that robustness in the face of model uncertainty calls for a more
cautious policy; that is a lower responses to current or expected ination
captured by the parameter  or to current ination reected in w and
more gradualism (high ). This result in fact goes back to Brainard (1967),
but it should be pointed out that it contrasts with the robust policy rules
that arise from the Hansen-Sargent minimax approach that see robust policy
as being faster and more aggressive.
Second, forward-looking ination targeting rules perform badly in the
sense they raise the welfare costs of uctuations compared with optimal sim-
ple rules that only respond to current ination. The source of this result is
the well-known problem of indeterminacy { forward-looking rules certainly
14pin down expectations of future ination, but fail to uniquely anchor the cur-
rent price level resulting in an innite number of equilibrium paths that will
return the economy to its steady-state(see, for example, Levin et al. (2003),
Woodford (2003), chapter 4 and Batini et al. (2006)).
Third, current ination targeting rule perform well in the sense they lower
the welfare costs of uctuations across all model parameter combinations and
model variants but the current wage ination rule is best of all. Robust de-
sign not even essential for such a rule. The best wage ination rule found by
minimizing the expected welfare loss with respect to the parameters  and
w for one central parameter combination (the modes of the joint distribu-
tion) and model performs very well across all parameter combinations and
models. The best wage ination rule is one where the change in interest rate
responds to wage ination{ this of course implies that the current interest
rate should respond to the nominal wage level.
The attractive stabilization properties of the wage ination rule have
also been reported by Levin et al. (2006), but only for what we call model
variant robust rules. The results owes a lot to the particular way in which
ination costs are modelled (as in Woodford (2003) as originating from the
dispersion of labour demand across rms setting staggered wages and prices.
The robustness exercise is perhaps too limited in that one should consider
alternative labour market models with associated alternative models of the
costs of ination. This I suggest is just one future area for research, taking
us to the nal section of the paper.
5 DSGE Models and Emerging Economies
...capital inows are raising the tensions of the \impossible trin-
ity". IMF (2008).
While there is a substantial body of literature devoted to understand-
ing business cycle dynamics in developed economies, research focusing on
emerging economies is relatively sparser. Data limitations have often been
15identied as a cause, but the real challenge is to provide sensible expla-
nations for the markedly distinct observed uctuations in these economies.
Indeed, some stylized facts may be pointed out: output growth tends to be
subject to larger swings in developing countries, private consumption, rela-
tive to income, is substantially more volatile, terms of trade and output are
strongly positively correlated, while real interest rates and net exports are
countercyclical (see Agenor et al. (2000) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005), for
example). Emerging market economies are also vulnerable to sudden and
sharp reversals of capital inows, the \sudden stops" highlighted in Calvo
(1998). Understanding these dierences and carefully modeling the trans-
mission mechanism of internal and external shocks is crucial to the design of
stabilization programs and the conduct of economic policies.
Thus, in Batini et al. (2009a) we develop a two-bloc model of an emerg-
ing open economy interacting with the rest of the world. Alongside standard
features of small open economies (SOE) such as a combination of producer
and local currency pricing for exporters and oil imports, our model incorpo-
rates nancial frictions in the form of a nancial accelerator, where capital
nancing is partly or totally in foreign currency, as in Gertler et al. (2003)
and Gilchrist (2003)). This intensies the exposure of a SOE to internal and
external shocks in a manner consistent with the stylized facts listed above. In
addition, we allow for liability dollarization and liquidity-constrained house-
holds, which further amplify the eects of nancial stress. We then focus on
monetary policy analysis, calibrating the model using data for India and the
US economy. The Indian economy is small in relation to the world economy
and we therefore treat it as a small open economy.
Many emerging economies conduct their monetary and scal policy ac-
cording to the `three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combina-
tion of a freely oating exchange rate, an explicit target for ination over
the medium run, and a mechanism that ensures a stable government debt-
GDP ratio around a specied long run, but may allow for counter-cyclical
adjustments of the scal decit over the business cycle. By contrast, the cur-
16rency monetary policy stance of the Indian Reserve Bank intervenes in the
foreign exchange market to prevent what it regards as excessive volatility of
the exchange rate. On the scal side, Central Government has a rigid scal
decit target of 3% of GDP irrespective of whether the economy is in boom
or recession (Shah (2008)). Thus, our framework allow us to contrast these
implied policy prescriptions for interest rate rules.
There is now a growing literature that compares alternative monetary
policy regimes in their ability to stabilize emerging economies when faced
with shocks and nancial frictions. Some papers close to ours include Gertler
et al. (2003), Cespedes et al. (2004), Cook (2004), Devereux et al. (2006) and
Curdia (2008). All these papers conrm the result in this paper that exible
exchange rate regimes outperform a peg. Only Curdia (2008) compares these
regimes with the optimal policy, but only in deterministic exercise in which
optimal policy is designed following a sudden stop. By contrast our rules are
optimal or, the case of simple rules optimized within the category or rule in
anticipation of a range of future stochastic shocks. An important feature of
our work is the introduction of a zero lower bound into the construction of
policy rules.
Finally future modelling developments will include the introduction of
a large informal sector into our DSGE model and an attempt to estimate
the model by Bayesian-Maximum-Likelihood methods using the calibration
here as priors. In doing so we will confront the data limitations associated
especially with the informal and partly hidden economy by adopting a con-
sistent partial information assumption for the econometrician and private
sector alike, as in Levine et al. (2009).
6 The `Road Ahead'?
All models are wrong, but some are useful. Box (1979).
The paper has attempted an overview of the `journey so far' for macroeco-
nomic modelling. Where do my remarks leave the `road ahead'? To organize
17my conclusions it is useful to view a macro-model as being constructed in
two stages: rst a model of the aggregate economy given a particular model
of how expectations are formed by economic agents; and second, the model
of expectations formation. We consider these two stages in turn
 Better Models given Expectations Formation
There are a number of areas where DSGE models need developing,
especially for emerging economies. Until recently as with their RBC
antecedents the New Keynesian forms still omitted involuntary unem-
ployment. We are now seeing labour markets models with unemploy-
ment (see for example Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Thomas (2008))
but practically nothing with the informal economy (see Batini et al.
(2009c)). Another major lacuna in the NK models has been the ab-
sence of a banking sector. The monetary transmission mechanism ex-
isted simply through one nominal interest on a riskless bond, `set' by
the central bank. The seminal work on nancial frictions by Bernanke
et al. (1999) introduced a risk premium paid by rms with an implicit
intermediary nancial institution. But it is only very recently that a
comprehensive banking sector has appeared { see Goodfriend and Mc-
Callum (2007) as a representative example of this development. In gen-
eral to move toward more heterogeneous models rather than attempting
to model the full distribution of agents it makes sense to rst work on
more disaggregated models by introducing formal and informal sector,
credit-constrained non-Ricardian (poor) household alongside Ricardian
(well-o) households, entrepreneurs and workers etc.
 Models of Expectations Formation
Staying broadly within the rational expectations paradigm a number
of renements are on oer that assume that agents are not able to
perfectly observe states that dene the economy. The `Rational Inat-
tention' literature (Sims (2005), Luo and Young (2009), Luo (2006))
ts into this agenda. The basic idea is that agents can process in-
formation subject to a constraint that places an upper bound on the
18information ow. Borrowing from information theory (which in turn
borrows from statistical physics) the idea is formalized by an upper
bound on the decrease in entropy that ensues as agents proceed from a
prior to a posterior of a signal. Levine et al. (2007) propose a general
framework for introducing information limitations at the point agents
form expectations. A more drastic deviation from rational expectations
is provided by the statistical rational learning literature already men-
tioned. This introduces a specic form of bounded rationality in which
utility-maximizing agents make forecasts in each period based on stan-
dard econometric techniques such as least squares. In many cases this
converges to a rational expectations equilibrium. All these renements
contrast with the drastic alternative oered by the very recent `Animal
Spirits' approach (Akerlof and Shiller (2009), DeGrauwe (2009)). The
latter paper is particularly apposite as it proposes a radical alternative
to a standard New Keynesian model with rational expectations. Some
agents are optimists and some are pessimists and use ad hoc simple
rules to forecast future output. There are shifts from optimism to pes-
simism are driven by a form of adaptive expectations which drive en-
dogenous cycles and inertia without inertial mechanisms such as habit
and indexing. This framework provides an interesting challenge to the
existing paradigm which needs to show that, with the renements set
out here, it can too explain the same stylized facts without recourse to
these inertial mechanisms.
By treating DSGE models estimated by Bayesian-Maximum-Likelihood
methods I have argued that they can be considered as probability models in
the sense described by Sims (2007) and be used for risk-assessment and policy
design. This is true for any one model, but with a range of models on oer
it is possible also to design interest rate rules that are simple and robust
across the rival models and across the distribution of parameter estimates
for each of these rivals as in Levine et al. (2008). After making models
better in the sense described in the rst part of this section, a possible road
19ahead is to consider rival models as being distinguished by the model of
expectations. This would avoid becoming `a prisoner of a single system' at
least with respect to expectations formation where, as we have seen, there is
relatively less consensus on the appropriate modelling strategy.
References
Agenor, P., McDermott, C. J., and Prasad, E. S. (2000). Macroeconomic
Fluctuations in Developing Countries: Some Stylized Facts. The World
Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 251{285.
Akerlof, G. A. and Shiller, R. J. (2009). Animal Spirits. Princeton University
Press.
An, S., Chang, Y., and Kim, S.-B. (2008). Can a Representative-Agent Model
Represent a Heterogeneous- Agent Economy? Working Paper No. 542,
University of Rochester, .
Barro, R. J. (2007). Rare Disasters, Asset Prices and Welfare Costs. NBER
Working Paper No. 13690.
Batini, N., Justiniano, A., Levine, P., and Pearlman, J. (2006). Robust
Ination-Forecast-Based Rules to Shield against Indeterminacy. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 1491{1526.
Batini, N., Gabriel, V., Levine, P., and Pearlman, J. (2009a). A Floating
versus Managed Exchange Rate Regime in a DSGE Model of India. Mimeo,
University of Surrey.
Batini, N., Kim, Y.-B., Levine, P., and Lotti, E. (2009b). Informal Labour
and Credit markets: A Survey. University of Surrey DP 06/09 and forth-
coming IMF WP.
Batini, N., Levine, P., and Lotti, E. (2009c). The Costs and Benets of
Informalization in a Two-Sector New Keynesian Model. Presented at the
205th Meeting of the NIPFP-DEA Research Program, 16-17 September 2009,
New Delh.
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S. (1999). The Financial Accelerator
in Quantitative Business Cycles. In M. Woodford and J. B. Taylor, editors,
Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1C. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Blanchard, O. and Gali, J. (2007). A New Keynesian Model with Unemploy-
ment. Centre for Financial Studies WP No, 2007/08.
Blanchard, O. J. (2008). The State of Macro. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper 14259 .
Box, G. E. P. (1979). Robustness in the Strategy of Scientic Model Building.
In R. L. Launer and G. N. Wilkinson, editors, Robustness in Statistics,
pages 210{236. New York: Academic Press.
Brainard, W. (1967). Uncertainty and the eectiveness of policy. American
Economic Review, 47(2), 411{425.
Calvo, G. A. (1998). Capital Flows and Capital-Markets Crises. Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 1(1), 35{54.
Campbell, J. Y. (2003). Consumption-Based Asset Pricing. In G. M. Con-
stantinides, M. Harris, and R. M. Stulz, editors, Handbook of the Eco-
nomics of Finance 1, pages 803{887. North Holland Elsevier.
Canova, F. and Sala, L. (2006). Back to Square One: Identication Issues in
DSGE Models. ECB Working Paper Series No. 583.
Cespedes, L. F., Chang, R., and Velasco, A. (2004). Balance Sheets and
Exchange Rate Policy. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1183{1193.
Chari, V. V., McGrattan, E. R., and Kehoe, P. J. (2008). New Keynesian
Models: Not Yet Useful for Policy Analysis. NBER Working Paper 14313.
21Cook, D. (2004). Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 51(6), 1155{1181.
Curdia, V. (2008). Optimal Monetary Policy under Sudden Stops. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Sta Report no. 323.
DeGrauwe, P. (2009). Animal Spirits and Monetary Policy. Mimeo, Univer-
sity of Leuven.
Devereux, M. B., Lane, P. R., and Xu, J. (2006). Exchange Rates and
Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies. The Economic Journal,
116(511), 478{506.
Evans, G. W. and Honkapohja, S. (2001). Learning and Expectations in
Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas (2003). Monetary Policy and Uncertainty:
Adapting to a Changing Economy. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City.
Fernandez-Villaverde, J. (2009). The Econometrics of DSGE Models. CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 7159.
Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., and Natalucci, F. M. (2003). External Constraints
on Monetary Policy and the Financial Accelerator. NBER Working Paper
No. 10128.
Gilchrist, S. (2003). Financial Markets and Financial Leverage in a Two-
Country Word-Economy. Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 228.
Goodfriend, M. and McCallum, B. T. (2007). Banking and interest rates in
monetary policy analysis: A quantitative exploration. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 54(5), 1480{1507.
Greenspan, A. (2004). Risk and uncertainty in monetary policy. American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 94, 33{40.
22Hansen, L. and Sargent, T. J. (2003). Robust Control of Forward-Looking
Models. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 581{604.
Hansen, L. and Sargent, T. J. (2007). Robustness. Princeton University
Press.
Heathcote, J., Storesletten, K., and Violante, G. L. (2009). Quantitative
Macroeconomics with Heterogeneous Households. NBER W.P. no. 1468.
IMF (2008). India: 2007 Article IV ConsultationSta Report; Sta State-
ment. IMF Country Report No. 08/51.
Iskrev, N. (2008). How Much Do We Learn from the Estimation of DSGE
Models? A Case Study of Identication Issues in a New Keynesian Business
Cycle Model. Mimeo, University of Michigan.
Koop, G. (2003). Bayesian Econometrics. Wiley.
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1982). Time to Build and Aggregate
Fluctautions. Econometrica, 50, 1345{1370.
Leamer, E. (1978). Specication Searches. Wiley.
LeBaron, B. and Tesfatsion, L. (2008). Modeling Macroeconomics as Open-
Ended Dynamic Systems of Interacting Agents. American Economic Re-
view, 98(2), 246{250. Papers and Proceedings.
Levin, A., Wieland, V., and Williams, J. C. (2003). The Performance of Ina-
tion Forecast-Based Rules Under Model Uncertainty. American Economic
Review, 93, 622{45.
Levin, A., Onatski, A., Williams, J. C., and Williams, N. (2006). Monetary
Policy Under Uncertainty in Micro-Founded Macroeconomic Models. in
M. Gertler and K. Rogo (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2005, pp
229{387 .
23Levine, P. and Pearlman, J. (2010). Robust Monetary Rules under Unstruc-
tured and Structured Uncertainty. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 34(3), 456{471.
Levine, P., Pearlman, J., and Perendia, G. (2007). Estimating DSGE Models
under Partial Information. Department of Economics Discussion Papers
1607, Department of Economics, University of Surrey .
Levine, P., McAdam, P., Pearlman, J., and Pierse, R. (2008). Risk Manage-
ment in Action: Robust Monetary Rules Under Structured Uncertainty.
ECB Working Paper No. 870.
Levine, P., Pearlman, J., Perendia, G., and Yang, B. (2009). Endogenous
Persistence in an Estimated Model under Imperfect Information. Forth-
coming Department of Economics Discussion Paper, Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Surrey. Presented at the 2009 CDMA Conference, St
Andrews, Sept2{4.
Lucas, R. (1972). Expectations and the neutrality of money. Journal of
Economic Theory, 4(2), 103{124.
Lucas, R. E. (1987). Models of Business Cycles. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Luo, Y. (2006). Consumption Dynamics under Information Processing.
Mimeo, University of Hong Kong.
Luo, Y. and Young, E. R. (2009). Rational Inattention and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 9(1). Article 14.
Mehra, R. and Prescott, E. C. (1985). The equity premium: A puzzle.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 15(2), 145{161.
Myerson, R. (1999). Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory.
Journal of Economic Literature , 37(3), 1067{1082.
Neumeyer, P. A. and Perri, F. (2005). Business cycles in emerging economies:
the role of interest rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 345{380.
24Perry, G., Maloney, W., Arias, O., Fajnzylber, P., Mason, A., and Saavedra-
Chanduvi (2007). Informality: Exit and Esclusion. World Bank Report.
Pesaran, M. H. and Smith, R. P. (2006). Macroeconomic modelling with a
global perspective. Machester School, pages 24{49. Supplement.
Ratto, M. (2008). Analyzing dsge models with global sensitivity analysis.
Computational Economics, 115, 115{139.
Schneider, F. (2005). Shadow Economies around the World: What Do We
Really Know? European Journal of Political Economy, 21(3), 598{642.
Shah, A. (2008). New Issues in Macroeconomic Policy . NIPFP Working
Paper No. 51.
Shiller, R. J. (1999). Human Behavior and the Eciency of the Financial
System. In J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford, editors, Handbook of Macroe-
conomics, Volume 1C, pages 1305{1340. Elsvier.
Sims, C. (2005). Rational Inattention: A Research Agenda. Deutche Bun-
desbank, W.P. no. 34/2005.
Sims, C. A. (2007). Monetary Policy Rules. CEPS Working Paper No. 155.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2003). An estimated Stochastic Dynamic General
Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 1(5), 1123{1175.
Smith, R. (2008). Real-Financial Interactions in Macro-Finance Models.
Mimeo, Birkbeck College, University of London.
Thomas, C. (2008). Search and Matching Frictions and Optimal Policy.
Journal of Monetary Econsomic, pages 936{956.
Trichet, J. C. (2005). Monetary Policy and `Credible Alertness'. Speech given
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole.
25Wang, P. and Wen, Y. (2008). Volatility, Growth and Welfare. Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis, Working Paper 2006-032C, revised.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices. Foundations of a Theory of Mon-
etary Policy. Princeton University Press.
26